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Abstract
This paper investigates the joint labor supply decision in households in a
neo-classical framework. Besides the more traditional explanatory va-
riables like wages, taxes, welfare-benefits and demographic factors. we
highlight the importance of habit formation and interdependence of prefe-
rences. Habit formation adds a dynamic aspect to the ste.ndard neo-class~-
cal model. Incorporation of interdependent preferences yields a micro-
model that implies different wage elasticities of labor supply for indivi-
dual households than for aggregates. As such it may account for the often
observed inconsistencies between predictions from micro-models and macro-
models.
We find that the model with habit formation and preference inter-
dependence produces results different from the standard model without
these factors. Since the extended model must be preferred on statistical




The main contribution of this paper is the implementation of habit
formation and interdependence of preferences in a neoclassical model of
household labor supply. We allow for the fact that individuals may get
used to working a certain number of hours per week (habit formation) and
that the number of hours they prefer to work may depend on the number of
hours other people worked (interdependence of preferences). Habit forma-
tion and preference interdependence jointly will often be referred to as
preference formation.
The notion that preferences may be endogenous has gained some
foothold in the literature on consumer demand equations [cf., e.g., Pollak
(1970, 1976), Phlips (1984), Gaertner (1974), Blanciforti and Green
(1983), Darrough, Pollak and Wales (1983), Alessie and Kapteyn (1986) and
the references given in these papers], but hardly any in the labor supply
literature. Empirically, habit formation is usually the only component of
preference formation that is being modelled (habit formation may then be
either rational or myopic, cf. Muellbauer (1986)). In a few recent working
papers, Alessie and Kapteyn (1986) and Kapteyn, Van de Geer, Van de Stadt
and Wansbeek (1985) have also incorporated preference interdependence into
empirical models of consumption following theoretical notions developed by
Gaertner (1974) and Pollak (1976). In the present paper, the framework
developed in the two former papers is extended to deal with household
labor supply.
The incorporation of preference formation in a neoclassical model
is only one step towards a realistic model of labor supply. It would be
tempting to start from an extremely simple model of labor supply and to
concentrate entirely on preference formation. As a matter of fact, this is
the predominant strategy found in the economic literature: one concen-
trates on one important aspect and ignores other factors as much as pos-
sible. There are two problems with this. First, oversimplifying a model
introduces misspecification which in general will tend to bias statistical
tests meant to investigate whether a certain factor (e.g. habit formation)
is important in the explanation of behavior. Secondly, and related to the
first point, given the oversimplification of the model, any extension of
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it will look good, if only because it relaxes the restrictiveness of the
:~lm~,le model.
To avoid such problems at least to some extent, we start out from
an already fairly complex neoclassical model of household labor supply
developed in earlier work (Kapteyn, Kooreman, Van Soest (1986), to be
referred to as KKS from now on) and then add explanatory variables repre-
senting preference formation. The draw-back of this approach is of course
its complexity. Yet, to arrive eventually at a realistic model of house-
hold labor supply, we should sim at one model which integrates as many
relevant aspects as possible, rather than aiming at a sequence of models
that all highlight one factor and are misspecified otherwise.
In Section 2 the neoclassical model that is used as a starting
point is described briefly. We shall refer to this model as the standard
model throughout. Next, in Section 3, preference formation is added as an
explanatory factor. In Section 4 we describe the sample and the estimation
results. Section 5 concludes. Given the fairly complex nature of the stan-
dard model, a number of appendices have been added which contain various
technical details.
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2. The Model Specification
We consider householdsl) with at least two adults capable of working in
paid jobs. The joint labor supply decision of husbands and wives is des-
cribed by the following model, due to Hausman and Ruud (1984):
~ N




hfk - bfk t~rf.w~ t a.w~ f pf.ytk, (2.2)
~
~lc - x1t } g} bmk'wmk } bfk'wfk i 2(ym'wmkayf'wfk) a.w~.wfk
(2.3)
where hmk .- number of hours the male partner in household k would like
to work per week.
h~ .- number of hours the female partner in household k would like
to work per week.
wmk and wfk'- after tax marginal wage rates of male and female, respec-
uk
tively.
.- (weekly) non-labor income of household k.
total number of households in society.N .-
~' bmk' bfk' ~m' ~f' a' ~f' ~m are parameters.
As these supply equations are quadratic in wages, the system is
second order flexible. Given that the parameters in the system satisfy
certain restrictions, h~ and hfk can be considered as the results of the
maximization of a well-behaved household utility function with male and
female leisure and total consumption as arguments. Since this is strictly
a model of labor supply, equations (2.1) and (2.2) describe the number of
hours the male and female partners would like to work, given the wage
rates and non-labor income. We will refer to the number of hours each
partner would like to work as preferred hours, whereas the number of hours
1) The words "households" and "families" are used as synonyms. This also
applies to the pairs "husband, wife", "male, female" and "man, woman".
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actually worked by each partner is referred to as actual hours. The actual
hours are generally the result of the interplay of household preferences,
institutional constraints, and the demand for labor.
In the survey our data comes from, preferred hours were measured
by asking both adult partners the following question:
"Suppose you could freely choose the number of hours you work per week.
How many hours would you like to work in your present job, if you could
choose them yourself and if you would earn on aversge the same amount of
money per hour as you do at the moment. If you choose fewer hours of work,
you choose for less income. And more hours of work means more income.
Assume that the number of hours of other members of the household if an ,
do not change."
From the wording of this question two things are clear. The respondent
should assume a linear budget constraint and he~she should assume that the
partner is rationed at her~his actual hours. The latter point implies that
the responses should be explained by rationed versions of (2.1)-(2.3).
That is, one should compute hmk with hfk rationed at the actual number of
hours and vice versa. See KKS and Appendix 1. For people without a job,
the above question was replaced by a question which asks if the respondent
is presently looking for a job. In terms of (2.1)-(2.3) this means for
example that if hmk is positive, the male should be looking for a job
(given the number of hours actually worked by the female) and that he
should not be seeking if hmk 5 0. A complication arises if a presently
unemployed person receives unemployment benefits. If this person takes a
job, Dutch Law implies that benefits will be reduced. Generally, this
introduces non-convexities in the budget constraint. As a result, the
person has to compare the utility of working zero hours and receiving a
benefit and the utility of working an optimal number of hours without
benefits. See KKS and Appendix 1 for details.
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3. Preference Formation
The main purpose of this section is to incorporate preference interdepen-
dence and habit formation into the neo-classical family labor supply model
described in Section 2. In most labor supply models it is assumed that
utility functions are constant. As a matter of fact, few economists have
analyzed models of interdependent preferences, although the idea that
social interactions between individuals are important determinants of
one's utility is common in sociology and psychology. Some economic studies
are theoretical papers by Becker (19~4), Scott (19~2), and empirical
papers by Tomes (1983) and Kapteyn et.sl. (1985). Here we want to allow
for the possibility of endogeneous preferences, pretty much along the
lines discussed by Pollak (1976) and by Van de Stadt, Kapteyn and Van de
Geer (1985).
Habit formation is incorporated into the model by writing certain
parameters of the labor supply model as a function of the number of hours
worked in the previous period by the male and the female. Preference in-
terdependence is modelled by making the same parameters also dependent
upon the number of hours worked by other individuals in the social re-
ference group (a concept to be defined later on), lagged one period.
The choice of the parameters that are made dependent is somewhat
arbitrary. We have selected the "translation parameters" (cf. Pollak and
Wales (1981)) b~ and bfk, mainly for reasona of simplicity. The specifi-
cation adopted is:
bmk - bm0 t~,mm ~ vk~ h~(-1) ' nmf ~ v~ hf~(-1)
m f
k-1,...,N
bfk - bfG { nff ,LEP- Vk~





Pm .- the set of all adult males in society
Pf .- the set of all adult females in society
hmk(-1) :- lagged value of actual hours worked by the male in
household k.
hfk(-1) :- lagged value of actual hours worked by the female in
household k.
Sm0' bf0' ~mm' nmf' ~ff' ~fm are parameters,
0 5 nmm } ~mf' nff `~fm S 1
vk~, vk~, v~, vk~ z 0, for all k, ,Z,
~ ~k~ - 1' ~ ~k.~ - 1' ~ ~k.~ - 1, F v~ - 1,
m f f ~m
for all k
Notice that it is assumed that the male (female) parameter b (á ) notmk fkonly depends on male (female) hours but also on female (male) hours. In
other words, men and women refer both to individuals of their own sex and
to individuals of the other sex.
The vk~'s are called reference weights. For example vk~ represents the
importance attached by the male in family k to labor supply behavior of
the female in family ,~. If, for instance, vk~ - 0 the female in family .~
does not belong to the reference group of the male in family k, if vk~ ~ 0
she does. Similar interpretations can be given to vk~, vk~ and v~.
The parameters n measure the importance of preference formation.
For example, nmf represents the extent to which the preference parameter
b~ is influenced by the labor supply behavior of females in the reference
group of the male in family k.
By inserting (3.1) and (3.2) into (2.1) -(2.3) we obtain a model
which relates observables to observables, but with far too many parameters
to be estimated. To reduce this huge number of parameters, a number of
additional assumptions will be made.
First of all i t is assumed that v~ and v~ do not vary with k,
say v~ -~m and vkk -~f. This means that the relative influence of habit
formation is the same across households. Since F vk~ - 1-;m and
~EEPm
.i.~k
ï v~ - 1-;f, the relative influence of preference interdependence is
R~f
~~k
then also the same across households. The larger ~m (or ;f) the more im-
portant habit formation is relative to preference interdependence.




qk~ 2 0 for all k, .Z, i qk~ - 1 for all k.
~EPm
Similarly, we define q~ :- vk~~(1-;f) for k~~ and zero otherwise. For
notational simplicity we also replace v~ and v~ by q~ and q~ respecti-
vely.
Also the parameters q~ wil be called "reference weights". We
refer to the set of females for which q~ ) 0 as the social reference
rou of the male in family k. Define
hi.k :- E q~ h~~ i,j - m,f.
J .~Ep ~
The quantities h k are reference group means of working hours. For
example, the quantity hmfk is the mean of female hours in the reference
group of the male in family k. This makes it possible to rewrite (3.1) and
(3.2) as:
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bmk - bm~ t ~i~C~m.h~(-1) , (1-;m).h~k(-1)] t ~1mfChmfk(-1)]
(3.3)
bfk - bf~ , ~ffL3f.hfk(-1) . (1-~f).hffk(-1)] f ~fm[hf~(-1)]
(3.4)
withOs~Zm, ~fs 1
The second terms in both equations represent habit formation and the last
terms represent interdependence of preferences.
Next we consider hi~k in somewhat more detail. It seems reasonable
to suppose that an individual will primarily assign positive reference
weights to people whom he or she knows personally. Within the family we
distinguish two channels through which one can get to know other people:
the first channel is that one meets someone directly; the second channel
is that one meets someone through his (or her) partner. To formalize this
idea, let us take h~ (that is the mean of male hours in the reference
group of the husband in family k) and rewrite it:
h~ - E qk.C hm~ - ~ qlc,t hm,t ` L qk,l hm,t'
~~m ~mm ~fm
(3.5)
where S~ is the set of males that the husband in family k has met direct-
ly and Sfm is the set of males he has met through his wife (males whom
neither of the spouses have met are assumed to receive a reference weight
equal to zero; thus they can be assigned arbitrarily to either of the two
sets without loss of generality).
Let ~mm be the total reference weight assigned to the males in
Smm, i.e.
~k - ~ mm
mm ,~ES q~ ~mm
(3.6)
so that the total weight assigned to males in Sfin equals 1-~mm. We assume
that amm is a drawing from a distribution with mean ~mm, i.e.
k k~ - a tmm mm ~mm' (3.6)
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where E C ~mm,~mm~ -
0. Next define r~: - q~~~mm and s~: - q~~ (1-~~) . As
a result (3.5) can be rewritten as






Note that the r~ and sk~ are non-negative and "on average" they add up to
one, i.e. Ef ï rmj~aTTl - EI E s~~a~ - 1. We will also denote themm
rk~ and sk~ as "reference weights". Expressions analogous to (3.7) can be
obtained for the other hijk, i,j - m,f.
The development so far can be represented by a simple diagram. See
Fig. 1, which represents the way in which the reference group of the male
in family k is partitioned according to the assumptions above. To the left
are verbal indications of the various groups of people distinguished. To
the right are the weights they receive in the equation for b~ (3.3).
The final step towards an estimable model is to make assumptions
on the distribution of reference weights within each of the elements of
the partition in Fig. 1. Here we closely follow Van de Stadt, Kapteyn, Van
de Geer (1985), who make three assumptions which lead to the result that




rk~ h~ -( 1-xm) h~ t xm fim t error term, (3.8)
where the error term has mean zero and is independent of the other terms
on the right hand side of (3.8); xm is a parameter, 0 s xm s 1; fim is the
mean number of hours worked by all males in society; h~ is the mean
number of hours worked by all males in the social group of the male. A
social group is defined as the set of all males who have identical charac-
teristics, i.e. they are in the same age bracket, they have the same level
of schooling, etc. (see Section 4 for details). The parameter xm is an
indicator of how informative a social group is about the reference group
of an individual. For instance, if xm - 0 then (3.8) implies that the
social group mean is a good indicator of the reference group mean. On the
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other hand, if xm - 1, the social group mean conveys no information what-
soever about the reference group mean.
Similar to (3.8), we obtain as an approximation for i sk~ h~
~Sfm
,CES
mmi s~ h~ -(1-xm) hf~ t xm.fim t error term, (3.9)
fm
where hf~ is the mean of male working hours in the social group of the
female in family k(i.e. all males with characteristics equsl to the cha-
racteristics of this female). F.~cpressions similar to (3.8) and (3.9) are
obtained for the various other reference group means that play a role in
(3.3) and (3.4).
Relations like (3.8) and (3.9) lead to a further partitioning of society
on the basis of reference weights assigned to different people. Similar to
Fig. 1, the final partitioning of society on the basis of the weighting by
the male in family k is illustrated in Fig. 2. A similar diagram can be
drawn for the female in family k.
Thus far we have not taken demographic factors into account in our
analysis. The effect of household size has also been incorporated by means
of translating. That is, equation (3.1) and (3.2) have been replaced by
mmbmk - bm0 t rrm.fsk t r~~ ~ ~k~(h~(-1) - nmfs~)
} nmf ~ ~k,~(hf~(-1) - Rffs~)
f
bfk - áf0 f nf.fsk } Rff ~ ~k,L(hf~(-1) - rtffs~)
f
(3.10)
} ~fm ~CEP V~(h~(-1)
- rrmfs~). (3.11)
m
where we have defined "family size" fs~ as the logarithm of the number of
persons in household .~.
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Fig. 1 A partition of the reference group of the male in family k.
Fig. 2 The final partition of the reference group of the male in family k.
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Going through the same procedure as described above finally yields the
following expressions for the delta's:
ómk - bm0 ` rtmfsk t~~[~m(h~(-1) - nm.fsk) t ( 1-;m){xm(hm(-1) -
nm~s) f (1-xm)(~~(h~(-1) - nmfsmk) . (1-a~)Íhfmk(-1) -
nmfsfk))f~ ' Rmf[xf(hf(-1) - nf.~s) t (1-xf) (~mf(hmfk(-1) -
nffsmk) ~ (1-~mf)(hffk(-1) - rtffsfk))) ' wmk (3.12)
bfk - bfG t rtffsk }~ff[~f(hfk(-1) - rtffsk) t(1-;f).{xf(hf(-1) -
nf~s) t (1-xf)(~ff(hffk(-1) - rtffs~) t (1-~ff)(hmfk(-1) -
nffs~))f~ ; ~fm[xm(hm(-1) - nm~s) t (1-xm)(~fm(hfmk(-1) -
nmfs~) t ( 1-~fm)(h~(-1) - rtmfs~))} t Y~ (3.13)
where fsk .- logarithm of the size of household k
Psmk .- mean of the logarithm of the size of the households in the
social group of the male in family k.
fsfk .- mean of the logarithm of the size of the households in the
social group of the female in family k.
~s .- mean of the logarithm of the size of the households in
society as a whole.
rtm,nf are parameters
wmk' wfk are random variables with mean zero and independent of the
other variables on the right hand side of (3.12) -(3.13).
By now we have constructed a flexible neo-classical labor supply
model in which habit formation and preference interdependence are incorpo-
rated by means of translating. We will refer to this model as the "exten-
ded model". An important issue is the identification of the parameters.
From the labor supply equations (2.1) -(2.3) it is easy to see that the
i3
standard model is (over)identified. Thus, if we examine the identification
of the extended model with preference formation, we can confine ourselves
to examination of the equations for the b's. A discussion of the identi-
fiability of the parameters can be found in Appendix 2. At this stage it




Appendix 1 summarizes the complete specification of the model. The
model has been estimated by means of maximum likelihood for data on 847
households from a labor mobility survey in The Netherlands, ccnducted in
1yf35. '1'hc: apecaficetiun of the likellhood is givcn Li Appendix ;j. Sample
information about the main variables of interest is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Sample characteristics
mean in the subsample of
working individuals
male actual hours per week 42.23
actual hours per week, lagged
1 year 40.60
preferred hours per week 38.83
net wage ratea) 13.66
female actual hours per week 27.3g
actual hours per week, lagged
1 year 30.78
preferred hours per week 24.70
net wage ratea 10.60
a) Based on predicted wages. The wage equations used for prediction are
given in Appendix 4.
Table 2 contains a description of the labor force participation of the
individuals in the sample.




working not working, not working, not working, not working,
looking for not looking looking for not looking
a job for a job a job for a job
male
working 314 4 2 9 1 330
not working,
looking for a job 26 0 0 4 0 30
not working, not
looking for a job 450 0 0 25 0 475
benefit
not working,
looking for a job 6 0 0 2 0 8
not working, not
looking for a job 3 0 0 1 0 4
799 4 2 4i i 847
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As mentioned in Section 3, the sample of individuals has been
partioned in social groups in which the individuals have identical charac-
teristics. The characteristics considered are age and ediicatien level.
(four and five categories, respectively) In Table 3 socíal group means are
presented of working hours lagged one year. These means are not only based
on information for the 847 households used in estimation, but also on the
number of hours worked by single males and females. Single individuals are
represented in the sample, but the modelling of their behavior is not the
subject of this paper. The main results of the maximum likelihocd estima-
tion of the model for households are presented in Table 4.
A comparison of the log-likelihood values corresponding to the
extended model and the standard model makes it clear that preference for-
mation is a highly significant factor in household labor supply. Yet, the
estimation result for the extended model are not uniformly satisfactory.
The estimates for ~,fm and ;m had to be constrained by a lower limit (zero)
and an upper límit (one) respectively. As a result ~~ and ~fm are not
identifiable (See (3.12) and (3.13)). Generally, social group means of
male hours seem to have little impact.
One explanation for this may be that male hours in The Netherlands
are pretty much institutionally determined. The variation in social group
means of male hours shown in Table 3 therefore mainly reflects variation
across the life-cycle and across education levels of school enrollment,
involuntary unemployment and disabilityl). The households whose labor
supply we are trying to explain contain two able-bodied spouses who are
available for market work. These households' reference groups may hardly
contain the achool-going, the disabled or even the unemployed. If this is
true, the use of social group means to approximate reference group means
may be a poor practice. Without data that contains more specific informa-
tion about reference groups there is not too much we can do. For females
the situation is less bleak, because their working hours are less affected
by institutional constraints and hence the observed variation in social
group means are probably more representative of variation in reference
group means.
The parameters 6~ and avf in Table 4 represent the standard devi-
ation of the random component in the utility difference between working
2) For instance, in the age group 45-65 37 per cent of the male population
in The Netherlands is on disability.




i 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
0.82 0.84 0.70 0.50 0.92 0.95 0.78 0.57 log (family size)
18-30 32.44 35.06 34.22 29.98 12.74 16.23 20.21 24.83 hours worked,
43 88 134 58 74 112 235 65
lagg~d one year
number of indíviduals
i.i8 i.ii i.i6 1.08 1.26 i.28 i.2o 0.94
30-40 40.80 38.69 40.50 38.69 7.43 4.90 ii.35 18.63
71 96 281 i6o 136 146 234 92
i.28 1.25 i.26 i.28 i.26 1.34 1.28 1.17
40-50 34.i1 37.78 39.35 39.69 6.oi 4.66 9.90 i7.98
74 85 16i io7 ii2 li8 i35 50
0.9o i.o2 i.o5 0.96 0.96 0.87 0.83 0.64
50-65 20.99 29.56 31.89 34.15 2.95 7.36 9.86 i3.o8
i36 69 i59 93 i66 92 S4 24
a) Education has been coded in 5 levels ranging from 1(lowest) till 5( highest).
b) 369o individuals in households and single persons were used to form the social group means.
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~fm 0 (l.b)~m 1 (u.b)
standard model
Tim - ~tf - 0
(no preïérence formation)
(0.003) - 0.003 (0.008)




(30.1) - 40.6" (0.7)(0.2) 130" (0.2)
(0.5) 35.0" (0-9)(147) 62565" (148)(0.006) 0
(0.005) 0(0.02) o
0





6 7069 (1075)~~ 4708 (9393)







a) It is not possible to identify the parameters xm, xf. We have assumed
both to be equal to 0.5.
b) ":- absolute t value ) 1.6
Standard errors in parentheses.
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an optimal number of hours without unemployment benefits and working zero
hours with unemployment benefits. Their values are rather inaccurately
determined, mainly because in the sample there is only a small number of
individuals who have to make this utilíty comparison (cf. Table 2). The
small but significant value of p indicates some correlation in the labor
supply equations for the male and the female. Finally, it should be men-
tioned that concavity of the household cost function is satisfied in all
data points for both the standard and the extended model.
Turning now to the economic interpretation of the results, we note
that both columns of Table 4 show negative income effects, implying lei-
sure to be a normal good, and positive own linear wage effects. Moreover
we see that in both models family size has a positive effect on the male's
labor supply and a negative on the female's. The huge value of rtf (-1033)
in the extended model is due to the fact that ~f is close to 1. In fact
the reduced form coëfficient for (log) family size is nf(1-nff~f) }
Sf'~rtnCl-~nn~m,wm } nfCl-~ff~f~wf~ --9 (See
Appendix 2). This means that
if a family of 2 is extended to three persons, the wife works 3,5 hours
less per week. A second child reduces the wife's working hours by 2,6 more
hours per week. In the standard model the first child reduces the number
of working hours of the wife by 16, the second child by 11 additional
hours.
Male labor supply appears to be less influenced by preference
formation than female labor supply (the sum of ~,~ and nmf is smaller than
the sum of Ttff and ~fm)' ~rthermore, both men and
women refer to women
only. A possible explanation for this finding was given above. For both
male and female the importance of habit formation relative to preference
interdependence is overwhelming (~m - 1, ~f - 0.993). A high ~ff (0.979)
means that a female's social group mainly consists of women of her own age
and education, and hardly of any women of the same age and education as
her husband. A value of ~mf of about 2 implies that men refer to women of
their own age and education as well as to women of the same age and educa-
tion as their wives. Table 5 summarizes the "total" influence of habit1)
formation and preference interdependence on the parameters b~ and Sfk '
3) These numbers are invariant to the (arbitrary) choice of the
unidentified parameters xm and xf.
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1'he small influence of preference interdependence is clear from this
table. Yet, as will be seen below, preference interdependence does make a
significant contribution.
Table 5: "Total influence of habit formation and preference inter-
dependence
influence on
influence of bmk Sfk
h~(-1) own lagged hours (male) 0.210 -
hfk(-1) own lagged hours (female) - 0.991
h~(-1) s.g. mean of male hours in s.g. of male 0 0
hf~(-1) s.g. mean of female hours in s.g. of
female 0.031 0.003
hmfk(-1) s.g. mean of female hours in s.g. of
male partner 0 0.000
hf~(-1) s.g. mean of male hours in s.g. of
female partner 0.034 0
hm(-1) population mean of male hours 0 0
hf(-1) population mean of female hours 0.065 0.003
In Tables 6 and 7 more estimation results are presented for va-
rious alternative specifications of the model. (For reasons of space stan-
dard errors are omitted.) These shed light on the robustness of the re-
sults discussed so far. From the first two columns in Table 6 it can be
concluded that the lambdas are hardly identified. Different lambda values
lead to almost the same estimation results. For that reason we take the
~'s fixed from now on. Columns 3 and 4 show that the hypothesis ~mf - 0
and r~fm - 0 can be rejected at the 0.5X level. Consequently, the hypothe-
sis of no preference interdependence can be rejected. The hypothesis of no
habit formation (~m -;f - 0) is even more decisively rejected (column 5).
The last column of Table 6 ís enalogoua to the first column of'
Table 4, except for one difference. The results of Table 4 are based on
wage equations which are estimated jointly for working and non-working
2i
individuals. For working individuals, their actual wage is used; for non-
working individuals, the wage they expect to receive in case they should
find a job. The last column of Table 6 is based on a wage equation which
is estimated for working individuals only and with correction for selec-
tion bias. One observes that the two procedures lead to almost identical
estimates for the S-s, ~-s, ~-s, a-s, n-s.
Table ~ presents results for some additional versions of the mo-
del. The estimates in Table ~ are based on a subsample of ~96 households
from which sll recipients of benefits have been removed. Comparison of the
first two columns in Table ~ with Table 4 reveals some differences. In
particular ym, the labor supply response of the male to his own wage is
quite a bit larger in Table ~. In view of Table 2, this need not surprise
us. There are 42 males who are receiving benefits and 41 of those report
to be looking for a job. On the other hand, out of the six male unemployed
who do not receive a benefit, four are looking for a job. This would sug-
gest that money plays no role in a male's decision to work. In estimation,
this shows up as a small value for ~m. However, the answers obtained in
the ~~ueationnaire to the question whether a respondent is looking for a
job may be biased toward an affirmative answer because in The Netherlands
job seeking is a prerequisite for receiving unemployment benefits. Thus,
the results obtained for the subsample without recipients of benefits may
be more reliable than the ones presented in Table 4.
We also re-estimated the model without the assumption of ratio-
ning, thus deleting a possible endogeneity problem. The problem might
arise if actual hours (which appear in the shadow wages) depend on current
preferred hours. In that case male preferred hours depend on female actual
hours (via the shadow wage (cf. KKS and Appendix 1). And female actual
hours may depend on female preferred hours. That generates a system of
simultaneous equations. In the model summarized in Appendix 1 we have
assumed that actual hours do not depend on current preferred hours al-
though they may depend on lagged preferred hours. Comparison of the first
two columns of Table ~ and the second two columns yields almost identical
estimation results. This suggests that the potential endogeneity problem
is not serious. It also suggests that rationing is not an important pro-
blem.
22
Table 6. Estimation results for various versions of the extended modela)
~-s fixed a-s fixed,~ -~ - 0 no habát wage pre-mf fm
~mm-~ff- ~mm-~ff- ~-s - 1 ~-s - 2 formation dictions
~mf-~fm-i ~mf-~fm-2 on ac-
tual wa-
ges only
a 0.151 0.152 0.060 0.060 0.036 0.146
pm - 0.0008 - 0.0008 - 0.0015 - 0.0015 - 0.0015 - 0.0007
Sf - 0.0027 - 0.0027 - 0.0009 - 0.0009 - 0.0006 - 0.002'~
~m o.io5 0.106 0.298 0.303 0.310 o.loi
~rf 1.28 1.28 1.08 1.07 1.78 1.26
nm 2.21 2.21 1.09 1.04 1.10 2.21
nf - 1035 - 1034 - 856 - 794 - 41.4 - 1050
bm0 80.8 80.5 123 124 130 79.2
Sf0 178 178 37.7 37.7 11.5 180
g 72655 72870 65149 66099 62911 74503
n~ 0.207 0.210 0.201 0.225 0(l.b) 0.210
~ff 1(u.b) 1(u.b) 1(u.b) 1(u.b) 1(u.b) 0.994
~mf 0.205 0.258 0 0 0 0.251
nfm o.002 0.002 0 0 0 0.008
;m 1(u.b) 1(u.b} 1(u.b) 0.892 0 1(u.b)
~f o.991 0.991 0.989 0.988 0 0.998
a~ 1 1~2 1 1~2 1 -
~ff 1 1~2 1 1~2 1 -
~mf 1 1~2 1 1~2 - -
~fm 1 1~2 1 1~2 - -
am 6.01 6.00 6.05 6.05 6.33 6.01
6f 12.6 12.6 12.8 12.8 20.8 12.6
a~ 7071 7070 2549 2386 2618 7095
óvf 4712 4712 2408 2230 3211 4718
p - 0.074 - 0.073 - 0.032 - 0.027 - 0.087 - 0.087
log -4115.46 - 4115.01 -4127.19 - 4126.13 -4389.18 - 4118.52
likelihood
a) u.b. :- upper bound, l.b. :- lower bound
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Table 7. Estimation results for the standard and the extended model. Sub-
sample of non-recipients of benefits
without rationing
endogeneous variable: endogeneous variable:
standard extended preferred hours actual hours
model model standard m extended m standard m extended m
a - 0.031 0.048 - 0.0003 0.0007 - 0.0008 - 0.034
g - 0.0015 - 0.0015 - 0.0015 - 0.0014 - 0.0011 - 0.0008
pf o.0002 - 0.0008 - 0.0002 - 0.0009 - 0.0001 - 10-5(l.b)
~ o.31z o.316 0.310 0.296 0.213 0.077
yf 2.36 0.905 2.29 0.899 2.74 0.832
n 1.26 1.191 1.38 1.09 1.62 0.620
nf -41 - 818 -41.0 - 842 -46.7 -3129
óm0 130 127 129 123 131 65.8
bf0 35.9 36.3 35-4 40.1
34.9 -16.1
3 62379 67065 62563 65314 83145 62539
0 0.212 0 0.212 0 0.618~mm
nff 0 1(u.b) 0
1(u.b) 0 1(u.b)
nmf o 0
0 0 0 0
nfm 0 0
0 0 0 0
~ - 1 (u.b) - 1 (u.b) - 0.572
~f - 0.989 - 0.990 - 0.996
~ - - - - - 1mm
aff - 1 - 1 - 1
~mt, - - - - - -
afm - - - - - -
~m 6.30 6.04 6.32 6.04 6.91 6.19
~f 21.3 12.8 21.3 12.9 23.7 12.4
o - - - - - -~m6Vf - - - - - -
P - 0.028 - 0.014 - 0.086 - 0.073 0.006 0.014
log -4282.21 -4019.05 - 4281.78 -4020.19 -4385.54 -4036.37
likelihood
a) u.b. :- upper bound, l.b. :- lower bound
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In the last two columns of this table results are presented of the
estimation with actual hours as the endogenous variable instead of prefer-
red hours and without application of rationing theory. Although we realize
that there might be noise in the data on preferred hours due to interpre-
tation problems, we feel that preferred hours is the appropriate variable
in a model that describes the supply side of the labor market. For the
basic model the two versions do not differ very much. Looking at the va-
lues of the log-likelihood, it seems that preferred hours are explained
somewhat better by the model than actual hours. However, since the two
versions are not nested, no inference can be made from this difference in
the values of the log likelihood. In the extended model especially the
parameters corresponding to preference formation differ quite a bit. But
the wage and income coëfficients are also smsller in the actual hours
ver5lon than in the preferred houra veraion. The obvioua explanation for
this is that actual hours are largely determined by inatitutional con-
straints. Here too, the version with preferred hours yields a higher value
of the log-likelihood than the actual houra version.
To illustrate how the model works, Figs. 3 and 4 present labor
supply curves for a family without children. All variables not shown in
the diagrams have been set equal to their sample means. For the extended
model, we distinguish between short term and long term supply curves. The
short term supply curve of the male describes the relation between his
(after tax) wage rate and the number of hours he wants to work per week,
assuming that nothing else (including his partner's actual number of
hours) changes. A similar definition applies to the female short run sup-
ply curve.
In the definition of a long run supply curve we want to account
for habit formation and for the fact that a change in behavior of one
individual affects the behavior of others. Thus, to define a long run
supply curve of males, we start out by assigning all males the same wage,
leaving all other exogeneous variables unaffected. Assuming that indivi-
duals are able to realize their preferred number of hours, the model gene-
rates equilibrium values of the weekly number of hours worked for all
males (and for all females). We call this the long run labor supply of
males. By varying the male wage rate, we trace out the effect oF a change
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in the male wage rate on labor supply in society. Long run female labor
supply curves are defined analogously. For reasons of space we only pre-
sent labor supply responses of households without children.
Figure 3 shows a very flat male labor supply curve and there is
hardly any difference between the short and the long run. Due to the posi-
tive cross wage effect, men want to work more hours the higher the wife's
wage rate is. Both the wife's short term and long term labor supply curve
is forward bending, which meens that the positive own wage effect domi-
nates the negative income effect. The kink in the long term curve is
caused by the fact that at wage rate increases until a wage rate of 20
female labor force participation rises dramatically, although at first the
new entrants only work a few hours a week. The long term supply curve is
steeper than the short term one due to interdependence of preferences and
habit formation.
Figure 4 shows labor supply curves from the standard model. In
this case the short term and the long term curves differ only in that for
the short term the spouse's number of actual hours is kept constant, but
in the long run these are allowed to change to optimal values, i.e there
is then no longer any rationing. Once again we see a steep female labor
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Conclusions
It is encouraging to find that our extended model explains household labor
supply significantly better than the standard model. However the lack of
strong preference interdependence was surprising, considering other empi-
rical studies, which dealt with interdependence in consumption. (cf. Kap-
teyn et. al (1984), Kapteyn and Alessie (1986)). In the model with prefe-
rence formation, short term wage effects are small, but long term effects
are larger. This implies that for policy purposes considerable attention
should be given to the timing of policy measures.
There are a few important limitations to this study that deserve
attention. First, the simple way in which dynamics in behavior is incorpo-
rated needs to be improved. This can only be done when panel data are
available. Secondly, the stochastic specification of the supply equations
needs improvement, because random preferences are ruled out by our speci-
fication (See KKS). It would be of interest to extend the model with ran-
dom preferences. Thirdly, more attention should be given to the measure-
ment of reference groups. In the present paper reference groups were con-
structed by assumption. Direct empirical information on the composition of
reference groups is of crucial importance for the improvement of the mo-
del.
Despite these shortcomings, the empirical results so far suggest
it to be worthwile to take social psychological variables into account
when analyzing labor supply behavior.
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Appendix 1 Details of the Standard Model
Let h~ and hfk be the preferred number of hours of the male and
the female in family k, given that the partner is rationed at his or her
actual number of hours. The values of h~ and hfk are then generated by
rationed versions of (2.1) -(2.3) as follows:
- M
hIDk - ómk i~mw~ t awfk ~ pm.1~ .
- w
hfk - Sfk } yfwfk } ~wmk } Sf'N1c '
k-1,...,N
w
-f t 8 t b w } b w t}( ~r w 4 y w ) t aw w
~lc - ulc mk mk fk fk m mk f fk mk fk
t hfk(wfk - wfk)
xk~ - uk } g 4 bmkwmk } b fkwfk i}(~rmwmk t~rfwfk) t awmkwfk
t h~ (w~ - w~ )
-mM
hmk - Smk } ymwmk ` awfk } Sm.yk
-f~hfk - bfk } Xfw~ t aw~ f Pf.uk ,
where
hmk :- actual number of hours worked by male







Equations (A.5) and (A.6) define the shadow wages w~ and wfk used in
(A.1) - (A.2).
To make this an estimable model, a stochastic specification is added to
the model. For individuals who do not receive a benefit this yields the
following explanation of preferred hours:
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hmk - hmk 4 emk if hmk ~ Emk z 0
- 0 if hmk . Emk ( 0
(A.7)
hfk - hfk t efk if hfk t efk 2 0
- 0 íf hfk ~ Efk ~ 0
2
r0 l om pómóf
lOJ ' P~of o~
(A.8)
(A.9)
where hmk and hfk are observed preferred hours of man and women and emk
and Efk are error terms.
For individuals who receive a benefit we compute the utility Ulk
(i-f,m) of working an optimal number of hours without a benefit, and the
utility U~k (i-f,m) of not working and receiving a benefit. To allow for
stochastic preference variation we add a random error term to the diffe-
rence Ulk - UOk' ~e model for these individuals is now written as fol-
lows:
For individuals who receive a benefit:
Define:
m m
~mk - Ulk - UOk ` vmk
f f
~fk - Ulk - UOk { ~fk
~mk ~ N(0' ovm, ' ~fk ~ N(0'avf,
vmk is assumed uncorrelated with Efk and so is vfk with emk'





- 0 if hmk } Emk ~ 0 or Ulk - Ók } vmk ~ 0
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hPk - hfk } Efk if hfk } 6fk 2 0 and Uik - UQk a v~
2 0
- 0 if hfk ; Efk ~ 0 or Ulk - UOk ~ ~fk ~ U
(A.14)
The extended model is obtained from the standard model by parametrizing
bmk ~d Sfk according to (3.15) - (3.16).
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Appendix 2 Identification
The model without preference formation is (over)identified. Thus it is
sufficient to examine the delta-equations (3.12) -(3.13) for identifica-
tion of the model with preference formation.
Table A1.1 presents equation (3.12) -(3.13) in a slightly diffe-
rent form. From this table we infer there are 18 reduced-form parameters
(al - a18) and 16 structural paremeters, namely: , n ,~, n anmm ff mf' fm' mm'
~ff' ~mf' ~fm' ~m' ~f' xm' xf' nm' nf' Sm0' Sf0' It is easy to see that
from al and a6 nm can be identified, and likewise nf from a10 and a15.
From a2 and a4 ~~ can be identified, frem a3 and a5 ~mf, from all and a13
~ and from a and a ~ This leaves us with 12 equations (a , a tfm 12 14 ff' 1 2
a4' a3 } g5' a.j' a8' a9' a10, all t a13, a12 } gi4. a16, al~, a18) to
identify 10 parameters ~mm' ~ff' nfm' ~mf' ~m' ~f' Km' Kf)'
The equations a7 and a8 do not yield independent identifying information,
and neither do the equations a16 and el~. For these equations can be writ-
ten as follows:
a,~ - -a2.nm - a5.nf (A.15)
a8 - -a4.nm - a3.nf
a16 - -a14'nf - all'nm




In fact we have only 8 independent equations (al, a2 4 a4, a3 t a5, a9'
a10' all } a13' a12 ' a14' a18) to identify 10 parameters. If 2 paremeters
are fixed, the remaining 8 parameters are identified.l) Overall it is
necessary to fix only 2 parameters to identify the extended model.
1) Special combinations of fixed parameters still cause problems (for
example fixed ~, and ~ ).mm m























For explanation of the variables, see Section 3.
a) s.p. : structural parameters






















Appendix 3. Likelihood Contributions
The likelihood function consists of different parts (Lk) corresponding
with the different situations households are in. Let ~ and p be the stan-
ducd normril dJvt,ributiun functlun arrd duneity function r~epectively. Lel.
B~ and b~n be the bivariate standard normal distribution function and den-
sity function, respectively (with correlation p).
We distinguish the following situations: (where i stands for m(ale) or
f(emale))





hp - hr hP - hrik ik jk jk
oi ~ oj
2) hpk - 0, hPk ) 0, unbefik - 0, unbefjk - 0
a) ik is not seriously looking for a job:
L2 -~ -hPk - p hpk - hrk 1~ hjk - hjk
k 6iJ1-p2 6j,~l-p2 ctj oj
b) ik is seriously looking for a job:
L2 -k
-hPk p hpk - hrk 1 h~k - h'~k1-~
a J1-p2 - a J1-p2 aj ~ ej
i j
3) In the sample none of the households consist of two non-working indivi-
duals, both without an unemployment benefit. Therefore specification of
the likelihood contribution in this situation is omitted.
1) Unbefik :- unemployment benefit of the male or female in household k.
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4) hPk - 0, hpk ) 0, unbefik ) 0, unbefjk - 0
a) ik is not seriously looking for a job:
L4 -k
-hpk P hpk - hrk
eiJl-p2 - 6jJ1-p2
p r
1 ~ hjk - hjk
aj aj
b) ik is seriously looking for a job:
i i
. ~ Ulk - UOk
ovi
r i iP P
L4 - 1-~ -
hik - p h.k - h.k
.~ Ulk - UOk
k 6iJ1-p2 6jJ1-p2 ovi
p r
1 ~ hjk - hjk
'o. o.
J J
5) hik - 0, hpk - 0, unbefik ~ 0, unbefjk - 0
a) both ik and jk are seriously looking for a job:
r r i i
5 hik hjk ~lk - UOk
Lk - B~ aiJl-PZ , QjJl-p2 .~ ~vi
b) ik is seriously looking for a job, jk is not:
r r





A situation in which ik is not seriously looking for a job doesn't exist
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6) hpk - 0, hPk - 0, unbefik ~ 0, unbefjk ~ 0
a) both ik and jk are seriously looking for a job:
r r i i ,7 ~
L6 - B~ hik -~ .~ Ulk - UOk ~ Ulk - UOk
k 6iJ1-p2~ 6jJ1-p2 ~~i ~~j
b) ik is seriously looking for e job, jk is not:
r r i i
L6 - B~ hik -hjk ~ Ulk - UOk
k Ci.~l-p2 ~ 6j~1-p2 ~vi
r r i i j j
t B~ hik hjk . ~ Ulk - UOk . ~ - Ulk - UOk
oi,Il-p2 , ajJl-p2 6~i ~~j
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Appendix 4. Wage Equations
In our dataset not only actual net wage rates for working individuals are
available, but also expected net wage rates for non-working individuals.
We assume that for non-working individuals the expected net wage rate is
the appropriate variable for the explanation of the labor supply deci-
sions. Thus we estimate for each level of education (log)wage equations
for both workers and non-workers together, with the log of family size,
the log of age and the squared log of age as explanatory variables. Esti-
mation results are presented in Table A.2.
For purpose of comparison we also estimated wage-equations using
data on workers only. We corrected for selection-bias. (Heckman (1979)).




Log wage-equation for men
level of education constant log(age) [log(age)]2 number of R2
observations
i - 9.34 6.40 - 0.86 290 0.11
(2.13) (1.29) (0.18)
2 -12.60 8.12 - 1.08 340 0.27
(2.06) (1.17) (0.17)
3 - 7.72 5.30 - 0.67 656 0.16
(1-94) (1.08) (0.15)
4 - 6.01 4.27 - 0.52 385 0.16
(2.75) (1.53) (0.21)
log wage-equation for women
level of education constant log(age) [log(age)]2 number of R2
observations
i - 6.11 4.46 - 0.59 250 0.12
(2.30) (1.31) (0.19)
2 -10.46 7.04 - 0.96 280 0.18
(2.28) (1.31) (0.19)
3 - 8.41 5.85 - 0.78 540 0.15
(1.79) (1.03) (0.15)
4 - 7.98 5.65 - 0.75 194 0.09
(4.11) (2.31) (0.32)
a) standard errors in parentheses
b) 1 is the lowest level of education
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Table A.3: Participation-equationsa)
constant log(age) [log(age)]2 number of children log
younger than 6 likelihood
men - 2.1 0.20 - 0.0030
(I).4) (0.02) (0.0002)
-766
women 1.4 -0.04 - 0.00002 - 0.55 -1169
(0.3) (0.02) ( 0.0002) (0.04)
a) Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.4: Wage-equationsa'b)
log wage-equation for men
level of constant log(age) [log(age)]2 ~lc)
education
i - 13.87 9.02
(6.23) (3.56)
2 - 21.05 12.96
(5.46) (3.14)
3 - 16.34 10.24
(5.71) (3.24)




- 1.24 0.25 0.12 216
(0.51) (0.29)
- 1.77 0.41 0.29 292
(0.45) (0.27)
- 1.38 0.51 0.20 574
(0.46) (0.29)
- 1.59 0.26 0.26 355
(0.62) (0.32)
log wage-equation for women






3 - 8.59 6.00
(2.57) (1.49)
4 - 7.73 5-74
(5.63) (3.19)
observations
- 0.80 0.14 0.12 137
(0.28) (0.15)
- 1.62 0.14 0.30 152
(0.27) (0.19)
- 0.82 0.17 0.19 327
(0.21) (0.07)
- 0.81 0.41 0.15 131
(0.44) (0.13)
a) Standard errors in parentheses
b) 1 is the lowest level of education
c) See Heckman (1979)
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Appendix 5. Stability
To investigate the stability of the model we write the equations (2.1) -
(2.2) and (3.15) - (3.16) in matrix notation:
7
h- (~p ~ W t I2Nj b t J E1 (~~ Q x~1 t E




where h- Chml ... hmN--fl "' hfN,T' N:- total number of households
T
h - Chml . . . h~h fl . . . hfN
CsfJ




~ - ~Sml ... b~bfl ... bfN~
m ~m~m~1- ~ ~ ~2 - ~ ~f~. m
u5 - L~faJ
Txl - fwml ... wmN1
l. 2 2 .1 T
x2 - Iwml " ' wmN J
T




C~f~ ~4 - ~m~f~ ~f~f
Lsf J
2 2 Tx4 - Cwfl " ' wfN
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Tx5 - (wmlwfl ' ' ' wmNwfN~
x6 - ~ul . . . ,,~~ T





0 nff) ~ E2 - (0l
0
o, Vii- - - - - -. „ii
ii ~ 12 ~ 1N
V21 ~ , ~
~ ~ , ` Vii
'ii ii ~N-1,NVN1 - - - - -VN,N-1 ` ~0
. Qij -
Qmm 0 l 0 Qmf
Ql - 0 OffJ Q - l~ J
i,j - m,f
IN .- (N by N) identity matrix.
V1~- - - - - - Vij~11 i1N
~ ' ~
~ ` ~
Vi~- - - -`-`~VljNi NN
It is assumed that in the long run preferred number of hours, actual num-
ber of hours and actual number of hours one period lagged are equal.
Substituting (A.20) into (A.19) then yields
h-{I2N-GIE1Z ~ IN t rE1rI2-Zl ~ IN1 Q1 . rE2 ~ IN1 Q21~-1
{G lbo e ~ NJ
7




where G:- p~ W; I2N.
Define H:- GIE1Z H IN t rE1rI2-Zl ~ INl Q1 t (E2 ~ IN~ Q2).
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Stnt~ility of the model is guaranteed when it can be shown that the eigen-
values of H lie within the unit circle. By Gershgorin's Theoreml) we are
able to specify an upper and lower bound for the eigenvalues.
Gershgorin's Theorem. Each eigenvalue of the K x K matrix
A-[ai~] líes in some interval Ii -[aii - si' aii ; Ei]'
i-1,...,K where ei - i ai~
j{i
By applying this theorem to the 2N x 2N matrix H and assuming that each
wage rate is less than or equal to 50 (guilders per hour)2), we obtain
the union of all 2N intervals for the estimated parameters, presented in
table 6.4: [0.799, ~.9976]. so the model is shown to be stable.
1) See, e.g., Trenkler (1984)
2) This corresponds to about á 17.
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